A sufficient condition is given for a probability function in Inductive Logic (with relations of all arities) satisfying spectrum exchangeability to additionally satisfy Language Invariance. This condition is shown to also be necessary in the case of homogeneous probability functions.
Introduction
In common with recent developments in Inductive Logic, see for example [17] (and [1] , [2] , [3] for the classical approach), we shall work within a first order predicate language L with finitely many relation symbols, countably many constants a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . . and no function symbols. The intention here is that these constants a i exhaust the universe. Let SL, QF SL respectively denote the sentences and quantifier free sentences of L.
We say that a function w : SL → [0, 1] is a probability function on L if it satisfies that for all θ, φ, ∃x ψ(x) ∈ SL : (P1) If θ then w(θ) = 1.
(P2) If ¬(θ ∧ φ) then w(θ ∨ φ) = w(θ) + w(φ).
(P3) w(∃x ψ(x)) = lim m→∞ w( m i=1 ψ(a i )). Throughout w, possibly with with various annotations, will denote a probability function on L and, for the purposes of motivation, we shall be thinking of probabilities in the sense of de Finetti as subjective degrees of belief.
By a theorem of Gaifman (see [5] , where in fact the axioms (P1-3) were first formulated) any probability function defined on QF SL (i.e. satisfying (P1) and (P2) for θ, φ ∈ QF SL) extends uniquely to a probability function on L. In this sense then we can largely limit our considerations to probability functions defined just on QF SL. Indeed, by the Disjunctive Normal Form Theorem it then follows that w is determined simply by its values on the state descriptions, that is sentences of the form m s=1 b1,b2,...,br s ∈{ai 1 ,ai 2 ,...,ai n } ±P s (b 1 , b 2 , ..., b rs ) where P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P s are the relations of L with arities r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r s respectively.
In Inductive logic we are basically interested in the choice of probability functions w on L when these are intended to represent the beliefs, i.e subjective probabilities, assigned by a rational or logical agent in the absence of any prior knowledge. The key restraint here is that this assignment should be rational or logical and it is customary to identify this with the requirement that w satisfies certain rational or common sense principles.
A number of such principles have been suggested, see for example [1] , [2] , [3] , [8] , [10] , [13] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [19] , the most basic of which asserts that w should not treat the constants a i differently, equivalently:
The Constant Exchangeability Principle (Ex) For θ, θ ′ ∈ QF SL, if θ ′ is obtained from θ by replacing, respectively, the (distinct) constant symbols a i1 , a i2 , . . . , a im occurring in θ by the (distinct) constant symbols a k1 , a k2 , . . . , a km then w(θ) = w(θ ′ ).
We shall henceforth assume that all probability functions mentioned satisfy Ex. Notice that in this case the value of w on the state description as above does not depend on the choice of i 1 , i 2 . . . . , i n and so we may without loss always take these to be a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n .
There are two other such 'common sense' principles which we shall be concerned with in this paper. In order to explain the first of these we first need to introduce a little notation. Define the spectrum of Θ, denoted S(Θ), to be the multiset of sizes of the (nonempty) equivalence classes with respect to ∼ Θ .
Clearly expressed in this form Sx implies Ex. In the early accounts of Inductive Logic, for example [1] , [2] , [3] , [10] , the language L was taken to be purely unary, that is the predicates of the language are just P 1 (x), P 2 (x), . . . , P s (x) (but see [11] ). In this case state descriptions have the simple form
where the α h (x), h = 1, 2, . . . , 2 s are the atoms of L, that is formulae of the form
and Sx reduces to Atom Exchangeability, Ax, asserting that
depends only on the multiset of |{i | h i = j}| for j = 1, 2, . . . , 2 s .
The principle Ax was apparently happily accepted by Johnson and Carnap and the earlier investigators since it follows from Johnson's Sufficientness Principle 1 which they advocated.
The second principle which we shall be concerned with here is that of Language Invariance. The motivation behind this principle is that whilst we may at any one time be interested is some particular finite language L a rational choice of beliefs for that language should be capable of extension to a larger language. After all there is clearly no reason to suppose that there are only finitely many relations in existence and that L has already included all of them.
Language Invariance
The probability function w on L satisfies Language Invariance 2 if there exist a class of probability functions w L for each finite predicate language L (as usual with constants a i and no function symbols) such that whenever
In this case we shall describe the w L as a language invariant family containing w.
In the next section we shall derive a sufficient condition for a probability function satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability to also satisfy Language Invariance.
A Sufficiency Condition for Language Invariance
Before stating and proving the main result of this paper we need to introduce a particular family of probability functions u
and endow B with the standard weak product topology inherited from [0, 1] ∞ . Let
For a state description Θ(a i1 , a i2 , . . . , a iq ) (from language L) and 'colors'
where 0 stands for the special color black) we define j p (Θ(a i1 , a i2 , . . . , a iq ), c) inductively as follows: Having defined these j
By a straightforward generalization of the result in [17] (where just two colors were considered) u p L satisfies Ex and Sx.
Theorem 1 Let the probability function w on L satisfy Sx. Then for w to be language invariant it is sufficient that there is a countably additive measure µ on the Borel subsets of B such that for θ ∈ SL,
Furthermore in this case if L contains at least one non-unary relation then the language invariant family containing w is unique.
We call µ as in this theorem the de Finetti prior of w.
Proof Suppose that (1) holds. Let L extend L and for φ ∈ SL set
in other words w L has the same de Finetti prior as w, but the language has changed. We claim that w L ↾ SL = w. To show this it is enough to show that for a state description Θ( a) from language L, w L (Θ( a)) = w(Θ( a)), and for this it is enough to show that u
Let Φ( a) be a state description for L extending Θ( a) (and with the same constants a = a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a q ) and consider a summand j
This summand is formed by q choices of colors c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c q and an increasing sequences of choices of state descriptions a 2 , a 3 ) , . . . , Φ q (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a q ) = Φ( a). (Θ( a) ). Furthermore the only difference between these two contributions is that at each choice of the kth state description j p L (Φ( a), c) receives as a multiplicative factor one over the number of possible state descriptions in L extending Φ k−1 (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k−1 ) whereas j p L (Θ( a), c) receives as a multiplicative factor one over the number of possible state descriptions in L extending Θ k−1 (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k−1 ). Note that this depends on c k , genuine choice being available only when c k is either zero or not equal to any previous c j . However, since otherwise in each case these factors depend only on the relations in L and L and not on the particular state descriptions Θ k−1 (a 1 , . . . , a k−1 ), Φ k−1 (a 1 , . . . , a k− 
where M is the number of possible choices (according to c) of state descriptions of a in L extending Θ( a). But this means that
where Ψ( a) runs over the M many state descriptions of a in L admitted by c and extending Θ( a). Since
where the sum is over all extensions Ψ( a) in L of Θ( a), rearranging the summation on the right hand side yields
Of course the required 'full' language invariant family for w can now be obtained by restricting/marginalizing these w L .
To show uniqueness suppose that L has some non-unary relation symbol and that there are two different language invariant families containing w, say w ′ , w ′′ are the members of these families defined on L ⊃ L and they differ on some state description, Ψ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) say.
We first define a well founded ordering on state descriptions Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) of L or L, for fixed n, by setting
by induction on this ordering. The least point in this ordering is when the equivalence classes of ∼ Θ are all singletons. In this case let Φ L (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) be a state description of L having this minimal spectrum. (This is where we need L to contain a non-unary relation symbol, to ensure that such a state description exists.) Then ∼ Φ( a) must again be this minimal spectrum for any state description Φ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) of L extending Φ L (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) and w ′ must take the same value on these by Sx. Hence, since w(Φ L (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )) = w ′ (Φ L (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )) =
where the summation is over state descriptions Φ( a) extending Φ L ( a), we see that if M is the number of such Φ( a) then for any one of them a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )).
Since this reasoning also applies to w ′′ (4) holds in this base case. Now suppose that (4) holds for all Φ( a) ¡ Θ( a). Let Θ L ( a) be a state description of L having the same spectrum as Θ( a). Then again,
where the Φ( a) range over state descriptions in L extending Θ L ( a). Now all of these Φ( a) are less or equal Θ( a) in the ordering ¢, and Θ( a) does itself appear on the right hand side of this expression a non-zero number of times. Furthermore the identity (5) also holds with the probability function w ′′ in place of w ′ , and by the inductive hypothesis these terms are the same except possibly for the argument Θ( a). But then of course they must also be the same in this case, as required to prove (4) and the theorem.
An Application
For this section assume that our default language L has at least one non-unary relation. We first recall a classification 3 of probability functions w on L satisfying Sx.
Given a spectrum S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s k } let |S| = k and
For w on L satisfying Sx let w(S) = w(Θ) for some/any state description Θ with spectrum S. For Θ = Θ (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a r ) and S(Θ) = S (so S = r) let N L (S, T ) be the number of state descriptions Φ extending Θ with S(Φ) = T . By results in [16] , [17] , [13] this does not depend on the particular Θ with S(Θ) = S which is chosen.
We say that w is homogeneous if for all k lim r→∞ |S|=k, P S=r w(S) = 0.
In other words the probability that all the a i will fall in some fixed finite number of equivalence classes with respect to indistinguishability is zero.
We say that w is t-heterogeneous if
In other words the probability that all the a i will fall in some t (non-empty) equivalence classes with respect to indistinguishability is 1.
The following theorem appears in [16] , [17] for the case of a purely binary language and will appear in [13] for general not purely unary languages.
Theorem 2 Let w satisfy Sx. Then there are probability functions w [t] satisfying Sx and constants η t ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t < ∞ such that The following result 4 will appear in the forthcoming paper [14] .
Theorem 3 Let w be a homogeneous probability function on L (not purely unary) satisfying Sx. Then there is a countably additive measure µ on the Borel subsets of B such that for θ ∈ SL,
Using this result we have the following corollary to Theorem 1:
Corollary 4 Let w be a homogeneous probability function on L (not purely unary) satisfying Sx. Then w satisfies Language Invariance.
This is, to our way of thinking, a rather surprising result since it say in particular that just knowing a homogeneous w on a sublanguage consisting of a single nonunary relation is, provided we require Sx to be preserved, enough to determine it on all extensions of that language.
In contrast to Corollary 4 however:
Proposition 5 Let t > 1 and let w be a t-heterogeneous probability function on L (not purely unary) satisfying Sx. Then w does not satisfy Language Invariance.
Proof Suppose that w is a t-heterogeneous probability function on L and a member of some language invariant family. Let w ′ be a member of this family on L = L ∪ {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P t+1 } where the P i are new unary predicates.
Since L contains a non-unary relation we can find a state description Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+1 ) for L whose restriction Θ L (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+1 ) to L has a spectrum of length t + 1. a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+1 )) > 0, contradicting t-heterogeneity. So it must be the case that w ′ (Φ( a)) = 0 whenever the spectrum of the state description Φ( a) has length greater than t (since for any such spectrum there is a state description with this spectrum which extends a state description on t + 1 individuals of length t + 1). Now let Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) be a state description for L with spectrum of length t whose restriction Θ L (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) to L has a spectrum of length 1. Then if Φ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+j ) is a state description for a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+j in L extending Θ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t ) and w(Φ (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+j )) = 0 it must be the case that Φ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+j ) has spectrum of length t and in consequence the restriction Φ L (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a t+j ) to L must still have spectrum of length 1. Hence (a 1 , . . . , a t )) > 0, contradicting t-heterogeneity.
Notice however that it is certainly possible to have mixtures of t-heterogeneous probability functions (for different t) which are language invariant. For example if we take p = p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . ∈ B with p 0 = 0 and p s = 0 for s > t then u p L is a convex combination of r-heterogeneous probability functions for r ≤ t and is language invariant by Theorem 1.
Proposition 5 does not hold if t = 1, the trivial probability function on L which gives probability 1 to all the a i being indistinguishable (i.e. 1, 2, 3, . . . all being in the same equivalence class) provides, as L varies, the example of such a language invariant family.
We finally observe that the requirement in Proposition 5 that L contains a nonunary relation can be dropped if t < 2 s where s is the number of unary relation symbols in L.
Conclusion
Since both Sx and Language Invariance are (we would claim) desirable principles in the context of assigning beliefs in the absence of any prior knowledge it is pleasing to have a sufficiency theorem for such probability functions in terms the particularly simple functions u p L . This furthermore opens the possibility of deriving certain other properties of such functions by moving the onus of the task onto the much more malleable u p L , examples of which will be given in the forthcoming [14] .
